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is merely the English translation of a form of the word devoir30
which means to have a duty to do something, that is, ought as
equivalent to must. Judgment on this point in the aunt's favor
would have carried dangers for a consistent application of the




Public and Private Domain
Public property, namely, property of the state and its politi-
cal subdivisions, is divided in Louisiana and in France into prop-
erty of the public domain and property of the private domain.
This division, which corresponds to some extent to the Roman
distinction between res publicae and res fisci, has given rise to
doctrinal controversies in France. Writers are not in agreement
as to which things belong to the public domain and which to the
private domain, nor as to the criteria for this division.' In Louisi-
ana, courts have dealt with the practical implications of this
division in a number of cases.
2
In Landry v. Council of Parish of East Baton Rouge,s action
was brought by persons using a municipal airport to enjoin its
proposed closure and relocation by municipal authorities. In a
scholarly opinion, the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit held
that the decision to close and relocate the airport was not an abuse
of discretion; hence, plaintiffs were not entitled to injunction.
In the course of its opinion, the court classified the municipal air-
port as a thing of the private domain of the municipality, adopt-
ing the view that the criterion for the distinction between things
of the public domain and of the private domain is the concept
30. The form was the third person singular indicative, doit. See 3 LOUi-
SIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES, THE COMBINED EDITIONS OF THE CIVIL CODES OF LOUISIANA
151 (1940) for the French text of the article of the Civil Code of 1825 corre-
sponding to the present article 263.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIvIL LAW PROPERTY, § 30 (1966).
2. see e.g., Bullis v. Town of Jackson, 203 La. 289, 14 So.2d 1 (1943); Town
of Farmerville v. Commercial Credit Co., 173 La. 43, 136 So. 82 (1931); City
of New Orleans v. Salmen Brick & Lumber Co., 135 La. 828, 66 So. 237 (1914);
Daublin v. Mayor of New Orleans, 1 Mart.(O.S.) 185 (La. 1810); Louisiana
Highway Comm'n v. Raxsdale, 12 So.2d 631 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1943).
3. 220 So.2d 795 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1969).
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of public use. Things subject to public use fall within the public
domain, whereas things which "by their nature are not open to
use by the general public but are employed for common good"4
fall within the classification of things of the private domain. The
decision is correct in the light of the criterion adopted, and con-
forms with the principles of the Louisiana Civil Code as well as
prior jurisprudence. It would seem, however, that the injunction
sought by plaintiffs should be refused, even if the airport in
question were classified as a thing of the public domain. Govern-
mental authorities do enjoy a measure of discretion in the ad-
ministration of public property, which includes the relocation
of facilities subject to public use.
Things Subject to Public Use
According to well-settled principles of Louisiana law, things
subject to public use are burdened with a servitude in favor of
the public." The state, its political subdivisions, and any interested
citizen may bring action for the removal of structures which
tend to diminish public use.e Public bodies, however, may validly
grant to private persons, by franchise, concession, or lease, ex-
clusive rights over things subject to public use, as provided by
law7
The question whether exclusive rights may be granted over
the banks of a navigable river within the confines of a port au-
thority was raised in Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm'n v. Car-
gill, Inc.8 The Louisiana Supreme Court held that, under the
Constitution, the Port Commission had the authority to grant,
and did grant, exclusive rights to the Cargill Company for the
operation of grain elevators within the port of Baton Rouge. In
the course of its opinion, the court had the opportunity to reaf-
firm Lake Providence Port Comm'n v. Bunge Corp.,9 in which the
Court of Appeal for the Second Circuit held that a private owner
4. Id. at 801.
5. See Comments, 16 LA. L. REv. 789, 792 (1956); 12 TUL. L. REv. 428, 431
(1938).
6. See LA. Cv. CODE art. 861; Parish of Jefferson v. Doody, 247 La. 839,
174 So.2d 798 (1965); State ex rel. Saint v. Timothy, 166 La. 738, 117 So. 812
(1928); Locke v. Lester, 78 So.2d 14 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955). For this reason,
the Court of Appeal for the 4th Circuit held in Cadow v. Jensen, 218 So.2d
355 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969), that where a house encroached one foot on a
public street, its title was suggestive of litigation and action for specific per-
formance of the contract to sell was inadmissible.
7. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAw PROPERTY § 36 (1966).
8. 252 La. 718, 214 So.2d 119 (1968).
9. 193 So.2d 363 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 250 La. 269, 195 So.2d
147 (1967).
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may not be prohibited by a Port Authority to erect on his prem-
ises structures which is no way diminish public use.
Highways, Roads, and Streets
In the 1968-69 term, Louisiana appellate courts were again
faced with questions concerning the creation and termination of
public interests in highways, roads, and streets.
According to R.S. 48:491, an interest in the public use of a
road or street may be established through the maintenance by
a parish or municipality of a road or street for a period of three
years.'0 The interpretation of this statute has given rise to a
growing gloss of jurisprudence." In Winn Parish Police Jury v.
Austin,'2 a road had been admittedly maintained with public
funds for more than three years. Argument was made, however,
that the road in question had not become public because "the
statute contemplates that the acts of maintenance be authorized
by the police jury as a whole, that is, by ordinance or resolu-
tion."' 8 In a well-considered opinion, the Court of Appeal for the
Second Circuit dismissed this argument and held that the statute
requires "nothing more than that the work and maintenance be
done by appropriate authority, whether legally authorized or
not, and accomplished with materials and labor provided from
public funds. 1 4 Actually, as the court pointed out, a formal reso-
lution by the police jury to maintain a private road with public
funds would be ultra vires and without effect.
Interpretation of R.S. 48:491 was also involved in Town of
Eunice v. Childs,' a case in which the Town of Eunice sought
judgment declaring that a certain passageway was a public road
either as a result of non-statutory "implied dedication"' e or by
virtue of a "tacit dedication" under the terms of the applicable
statute. The court refused to find dedication of either kind and
held for the private landowner. There was no implied dedica-
tion because the evidence was insufficient to show either a defi-
nite offer by the owner or an acceptance by the public; and there
10. See LA. R.S. 48:491 (1950).
11. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIviL LAW PROPERTY § 33 (1966).
12. 216 So.2d 166 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
13. Id. at 168.
14. Id. The court indicated its approval of LeBoeuf v. Roux, 125 So.2d
444 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960), and Fontenot v. Veillon, 72 So.2d 587 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1954).
15. 205 So.2d 897 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
16. On the notion of implied dedication, see A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIvIL LAW
PROPERTY § 35 (1966).
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was no tacit dedication because the passageway had not been
worked peacefully and lawfully for three years after re-enactment
of R.S. 48:491 in 1954 to cover municipal action. 17 In the course
of its opinion, the court expressed doubts as to whether the
statute was applicable to "alleys" (distinguished from roads
and streets), and by-passed the question of the constitutionality
of the statute insofar as it involves "taking by the governing au-
thority."'8 The decision is of special significance because of the
court's insistence that the re-enacted statute applies prospectively
only'9 and that a protest by the landowner within the three-year
period excludes acquisition of the public interest.
Questions relating to termination of the public interest in
highways and other public roads were raised in Gayle v. Depart-
ment of Highways20 and Luneau v. Avoyelles Parish Police Jury. 2 1
Both actions involved claims for damages suffered as a result of
unlawful abandonment of public roads. In the first case, the
Court of Appeal for the First Circuit held that a state highway
may be abandoned only upon substantial compliance with the
provisions of the governing statute, R.S. 48:259.22 An abandon-
ment in fact is not an abandonment in law; hence, the state may
be answerable in damages for personal injuries resulting from
the condition of the unlawfully abandoned road. In the second
case, the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit found likewise
that the road in question had been unlawfully abandoned by the
police jury; but it refused to award damages for plaintiff's loss
of access to and from his property. The decision was grounded
on the doctrine of governmental immunity and on the considera-
tion that "the state and its agencies should not be easily held for
damages as a result of actions taken in performance of their
governmental functions, even though their actions might subse-
quently be held to be unlawful."23 There is no discrepancy be-
tween the two cases because according to the jurisprudence of
17. See La. Acts 1954, No. 639, now LA. R.S. 48:491 (1950). Until 1954,
the statute applied only to action taken by police juries.
18. Town of Eunice v. Childs, 205 So.2d 897, 901 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968).
19. To this extent, the decision tacitly overrules LeBoeuf v. Roux, 125
So.2d 444 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961). See concurring opinion by Hood, J., and
dissenting opinion by Culpepper, J., at 897, 901, 902.
20. 205 So.2d 775 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 251 La. 932, 207
So.2d 538 (1968).
21. 212 So.2d 231 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969). See also Luneau v. Avoyelles
Parish Police Jury, 196 So.2d 631 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967).
22. Accord, Lamartiniere v. Daigrepont, 168 So.2d 373 (La. App. 3rd Cir.
1964).
23. Luneau v. Avoyelles Parish Police Jury, 212 So.2d 231, 232 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1969).
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the Third Circuit the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been
expressly abrogated in actions against the Department of High-
ways;24 moreover, the first case allowed damages for personal
injuries attributable to the negligence of the Department of High-
ways whereas the second case disallowed remote or consequential
property damages.
MOVABLES AND IMMOVABLES
Immovables by Nature and by Destination
Under the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, certain movables
closely associated with a tract of land or a building are desig-
nated as "immovables by nature" or "immovables by destina-
tion."25 The classification carries practical consequences in various
fields of law, because movables that are immobilized follow the
immovable in cases of seizure, encumbrance, transfer, partition,
and determination of matrimonial rights.26
In Lafleur v. Foret,2 a landmark decision, the court faced the
question whether certain window air-conditioning units, dog
houses, and chicken sheds were movables or immovables. If mov-
ables, these things should belong to plaintiff, seller of a house;
if immovables, in the absence of contrary stipulation in the con-
tract of sale, they should pass to the purchaser. In a well-
documented opinion, the court re-examined the legislative basis
of immobilization and its relevance in the light of contemporary
practices and demands. Moreover, the court undertook an ex-
haustive review of Louisiana jurisprudence in this area, and
reached an interpretation that is worthy of praise. The window
air-conditioners, the court decided, were and remained movables.
There was no "permanent attachment" under articles 468 (2) and
469 of the Civil Code, and, therefore, attention was focused on
possible immobilization under articles 467 and 468 (1).
The court held that the test of "service and improvement,"
established in article 468(1), was not applicable. This test has
been consistently applied to both tracts of lands and buildings
destined to agricultural and industrial uses. The court, as it
24. See Herrin v. Perry. 215 So.2d 177 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968), cert. granted,
253 La. 305, 217 So.2d 407 (1969). But see Bazanac v. State, 218 So.2d 121 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1969, cert. granted, 253 La. 638, 219 So.2d 174 (1969).
25. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 462-469.
26. See A. YIANNOPOULoS, CIVIL LAW PROPRTY § 49 (1966).
27. 213 So.2d 141 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
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should, left open the question whether the test of service and
improvement should also apply to immovables destined to com-
mercial uses, 28 but it held firmly that the test does not apply to
residential immovables.29 Turning then to article 467, the court
held that the enumeration of "immovables by nature" is merely
illustrative; the list may be expanded to include things not
enumerated. Since air-conditioners are not enumerated, and
the parties did not take care to specify their subjective intent,
the court proceeded to a consideration of the tests of immo-
bilization furnished by this article by application of objective
standards, namely, notions prevailing in society. In the light
of house construction practices, and taking into account the
air-conditioners' degree of connection with the building, the court
decided in favor of the seller of the house. Since the test of ser-
vice and improvement did not apply to residential immovables,
the dog houses were likewise movables; but the chicken sheds
were classified as "structures" and immovables by nature under
article 464 of the Civil Code.
Incorporeal Movables and Immovables
According to the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, the division
of things into movables and immovables applies to both corporeals
and incorporeals80 In St. Charles Land Trust v. St. Amant,s1 the
Louisiana Supreme Court was faced with the question whether
a beneficial interest in an unincorporated land trust was an in-
corporeal immovable under article 471 or an incorporeal movable
under article 474. The St. Charles Land Company, a defunct
Maryland Corporation, owned mineral leases and servitudes in
28. This question was not before the court. It ought to be noted, however,
that French courts have applied the test of service and improvement to
buildings erected for commercial uses. See Comment, 5 TUL. L. Rsv. 90,
100 (1930). Application of article 468(1) to commercial destination of im-
movables seemed to be a relevant issue in Day v. Goff, 2 La. App. 75 (2d
Cir. 1925). The court, however, avoided this issue by finding that the mov-
ables in question served the convenience of the business conducted in the
building rather than that of the building.
29. See also Guillot v. Adams, 212 So.2d 193 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). In this
case a question arose as to the classification of a tractor-mowing machine.
Plaintiff, purchaser of a house, claimed the tractor as an immovable by des-
tination under article 468(1) of the Civil Code. The court held that the tractor
was a movable: it was not for the service and improvement of an immov-
able, but merely for the personal convenience of the owner. In effect, the
court refused to apply the test of service and improvement to residential
immovables, pointing out that the tractor was not used and it could not be
used for farming purposes.
30. See L&. Civ. CODs arts. 470, 471, 474.
31. 253 La. 243, 217 So.ld 385 (1969).
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St. Charles Parish, Louisiana. Instead of distributing these assets
to former shareholders directly, the liquidator of the corporation
transferred the leases and servitudes to a newly created St.
Charles Land Trust, to be administered by trustees for the benefit
of the former shareholders. The trust instrument designated the
shareholders as beneficiaries for both principal and income in
the same proportion as their former stock ownership; it also clas-
sified the interests of the beneficiaries as "movable property. '3 2
When a beneficiary of the trust died at her domicile in California,
a California court granted an order for the transfer of the Lou-
isiana trust interest. The trustees applied to a Louisiana court
for instructions under R.S. 9:2233, seeking authority to transfer
the deceased beneficiary's interest in the trust without ancillary
proceedings or the payment of inheritance taxes in Louisiana.
Determination depended on the classification of the interest as
an incorporeal movable or an incorporeal immovable. If the in-
terest was movable, it should be free from Louisiana inheritance
taxes; if it was immovable, it should be taxed.83
The Supreme Court found that a valid trust had been cre-
ated, and held that the interest of the deceased beneficiary was
an incorporeal immovable subject to ancillary administration
and the payment of Louisiana taxes. Since the trust laws of
Louisiana were silent as to the classification of the interest, the
court relied on the basic property concepts of the Civil Code.
According to article 471, which is merely illustrative in its enu-
meration of incorporeal immovables, the mineral leases and ser-
vitudes held by the trustees should be clearly regarded as incor-
poreal immovable property;84 and, since the trust was upon such
property, the court concluded that the beneficial interest was an
immovable by its object. The trustees contended that the matter
was governed by article 474, which declares that "shares or in-
terests in banks or companies of commerce, or industry or other
speculations, although such companies be possessed of immov-
ables" are incorporeal movables. The argument was answered
by the observation that article 474 merely creates a special ex-
ception to the general rule of article 470, which exception applies
32. Id. at 250, 217 So.2d at 388.
33. See LA. R.S. 47:2404 (1950).
34. Bee Succession of Simms, 250 La. 177, 195 So.2d 114 (1967). In Robi-
chaux v. Pool, 209 So.2d 77 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968), the Court of Appeal for the
First Circuit reaffirmed the classification of an overriding royalty interest
as a real right and incorporeal immovable; hence, title to such royalty could
not be proved by parol evidence.
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exclusively to entities possessing juridical personality.3 5 More-
over, the trust being "a unique institution of Anglo-American ori-
gin,... the beneficial interest in trust does not fall within the ex-
ception of Article 474."36 Finally, the court dismissed the argument
that the classification of the interest in question was controlled
by the declaration in the trust instrument that the property was
movable. "We find no sound basis in Louisiana law for enforcing
such a clause against the State of Louisiana," the court declared.
"It would permit the parties to a trust instrument to upset long
established legislative property classifications to the prejudice of
state tax agencies, though the State is stranger to the instru-
ment." 7
It is submitted that the result reached by the majority is
correct in the light of both legal precepts in the Civil Code and
policy considerations concerning the payment of taxes. Of course,
as the dissenting opinion pointed out, the nature of the property
held in trust should not by itself determine the quality of the
beneficiary's interest. This determination ought to depend on
whether or not the trust possesses juridicial personality under
Louisiana law, and on the nature of the beneficiary's interest as
a personal right against the trustee or a real right in immovable
property. If a trust possesses juridical personality, as Justice
Barham assumed in his dissenting opinion, it ought to be included
in the category of associations mentioned in article 474 of the
Civil Code. If, on the other hand, a trust does not possess juridi-
cal personality, there is no entity interposed between the im-
movable property held in trust and the beneficiary; his interest
in the trust is a direct interest in immovable property. In this
respect, it is my understanding of the law that prior to the enact-
ment of the Louisiana Corporation Code88 a land trust did not
possess juridical personality. Turning now to the nature of the
beneficiary's interest as a personal or a real right, the Louisiana
Trust Estates Code declares that the trustee has title to the
property subject to trust.89 This might be interpreted to mean
that the beneficiary has no ownership interest, but merely a per-
sonal right against the trustee, which ought to be classified as
35. See A. YZANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW PROPERTY § 66 (1966).
36. St. Charles Land Trust v. St. Amant, 253 La. 243, 257, 217 So.2d 385,
390 (1968).
37. Id. at 258, 217 So.2d at 390.
38. See La. Acts 1968, No. 105, LA. R.S. 12:1 (1950) and following. Accord-
ing to LA. R.S. 12:491-493 (1950), real estate investment trusts are now ac-
corded legal personality for a variety of purposes.
39. see LA. TRUST ESTATES CODE arts. 1731, 1781.
[Vol. 30
1969] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1968-1969 189
an incorporeal movable. Such an interpretation, however, would
be contrary to modern trends in trust law, according to which
the beneficiary of a trust has a real right in the property itself.40
This right of beneficial ownership ought to be classified as mov-
able or immovable, depending on its object, namely, the nature
of the property subject to trust.
REAL RIGHTS
According to Louisiana jurisprudence, interpreting the perti-
nent articles of the Civil Code, predial leases give rise to per-
sonal rights, whether they are made for a short or for a long
period of time, and whether they are recorded or not.41 Recorda-
tion may enable the lessee to assert his rights against third per-
sons, but it does not alter the nature of his right. In the 1968-69
term, the question of the classification of predial leases as per-
sonal or real rights was involved in Columbia Gulf Transmission
Co. v. Hoyt.42 In this case, lessors granted to Columbia a con-
ventional servitude for the laying of pipelines on land subject
to a recorded predial lease. Columbia, being a public utility, had
the right to demand expropriation of a right of way under R.S.
19:1, but did not follow this course because it was able to reach
agreement with the landowners. When Columbia began opera-
tions for the laying of its pipeline, the lessee objected and inter-
posed obstacles. Columbia then brought a suit for injunction,
claiming that the lessee had only a personal right against the
lessor; hence, any claim for interference with the lease should
be addressed against the lessor rather than against Columbia
who was a third person to the contract of lease. The lessee
claimed that his lease was "property" within article 1, section
2, of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921 and that the laying of
the pipeline on property subject to lease constituted a taking
without adequate and just compensation. The court admitted
that "Louisiana law, following the civil law tradition, classifies
the lessee's rights under a predial lease as personal rights,"4 but
held that the lessee was entitled to compensation before the lease
rights were damaged by the laying of a pipeline. The "consti-
40. See F. LAWSON, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF PROPERTY 45 (1958);
Pascal, Of Trusts, Human Dignity, Legal Science and Taxes, 23 LA. L. Ruv.
639 (1963).
41. See Leonard v. Lavigne, 245 La. 1004, 162 So.2d 341 (1964); cf. Har-
wood Oil & Mining Co. v. Black, 240 La. 641, 124 So.2d 764 (1960); Reagan
v. Murphy, 235 La. 529, 105 So.2d 210 (1958).
42. 252 La. 921, 215 So.2d 114 (1968).
43. Id. at 936, 215 So.2d at 120.
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tutional designation private property," the court declared, "is
restricted to no particular type of private property. It is suffi-
ciently broad, in our opinion, to include leases, though lease
rights may be classified as personal rights in the structuring of
our codal system."4 4
After application for rehearing was filed, the case was com-
promised. Since, however, the issues raised by the case are of
great importance to the law of the state, a brief comment is ap-
propriate. The decision of the court accords with a long line of
Louisiana cases declaring predial leases to be compensable in-
terests in expropriation proceedings.4 5 Under this jurisprudence,
if Columbia had not reached agreement with the landowners, it
should have requested expropriation of the right of way against
both the landowners and the lessee.46 This, however, was not the
issue before the court since Columbia had obtained a conven-
tional pipeline servitude from the landowners. Under the cir-
cumstances, the question was whether landowners of land sub-
ject to a recorded lease are entitled to grant a predial servitude
without the concurrence of the lessee. The answer to this ques-
tion ought to be in the affirmative, unless, of course, a recorded
predial lease is classified as a real right burdening the land
itself. The court, in effect, concluded that the landowner could
not grant a predial servitude without the concurrence of the
lessee, although at the same time insisting that predial leases
give rise to personal obligations. Perhaps, it might be preferable
for the court to admit that predial leases are hybrid contracts
under our system of law, partaking of the nature of both personal
and real rights. In expropriation proceedings, predial leases
function as real rights; in other situations, and especially in so
44. Id.
45. See State v. Holmes, 253 La. 1099, 221 So.2d 811 (1969); State v. Ferris,
227 La. 13, 78 So.2d 493 (1955); In re Morgan R.R. & S.S. Co., 32 La. Ann.
371 (1880).
46. In State v. Holmes, 253 La. 1099, 221 So.2d 811, 814 (1969), noted at
30 LA. L. RE v .... (1969), the Louisiana Supreme Court reaffirmed the rule
that "in expropriation of property encumbered with a lease, the rights of
both the owner and the lessee must be reckoned with in acquiring perfect
ownership .... Consequently, the expropriator to acquire perfect ownership
must expropriate the rights of the landowner and that of the lessee." Further,
the court held that when the valuation of the property has taken into ac-
count the interest of the lessee, the lessee as well as the landowner must be
compensated out of the common fund. The decision has cast doubts on the
validity of State v. Ferris, 227 La. 13, 78 So.2d 493 (1955), as a precedent. The
lease may no longer need to be expropriated as an entirely independent right,
but merely as a part and parcel of the ownership, with apportionment of the
funds between landowner and lessee.
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far as the admissibility of possessory action is concerned, predial
leases function as personal rights.47
PREDIAL SERVITUDES
Nature of Servitudes
In Kansas City Southern Railroad Co. v. City of DeRidder,48
a case of first impression in Louisiana, the question arose whether
a railroad company may be subjected to liability for a pavement
assessment as owner of a right of way. Plaintiff railroad com-
pany argued, inter alia, that it had only a servitude and that the
governing statute, R.S. 33:3301-3319, contemplated assessments
against owners of "real property." The court held that a railroad
right of way is real property within the contemplation of the
statute, and, therefore, a municipality may properly levy a special
assessment against the railroad. The reason for this, the court
indicated, is "that a servitude for railroad purposes is usually
for such long duration and is of such a nature that in practical
effect it is equivalent to the fee ownership of the property. The
fee owner in such instances ordinarily has no use of the property,
and he would not be benefitted by the improvement of an abutting
street, whereas the railroad may be benefitted by the improve-
ment.' '49 The decision was based upon the majority view in com-
mon law jurisdictions. The result reached by the court may be
equitable, but involves judicial law-making rather than applica-
tion of long-established principles of Louisiana civil law. Under
the Civil Code, "the part of an estate upon which a servitude is
exercised, does not cease to belong to the owner of the estate;
he who has the servitude has no right of ownership in the part,
but only the right of using it."' 0 This rule applies to all servi-
tudes, including railroad rights of way. It would seem that it
was the function of the legislature to establish exceptions; and
it is a stretched interpretation to maintain that the words "real
property" in special legislation were intended to cover railroad
rights of way.
Creation of Servitudes
One of the modes of creation of predial servitudes is by ex-
47. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3656; cf. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3441.
48. 206 So.2d 562 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 251 La. 1075, 208
So.2d 534 (1968).
49. Kansas City R.R. v. City of DeRidder, 206 So.2d 562, 565 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1968).
50. LA. Civ. CODE art. 658.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
propriation in favor of a public utility.51 Questions concerning
this mode of acquisition arose in a number of recent cases. In
Humble Pipe Line Co. v. Win. T. Burton Industries, Inc.,52 the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the landowner is entitled to
recover for damages to crops, even if the best use of the land
taken by the public utility is for industrial purposes. The court
declared that crops, to the extent that they belong to the owner
of the ground, are immovables by nature under article 465 of the
Civil Code, but based its decision on the ground that crops,
whether movables or immovables, are "property" in expropria-
tion proceedings. In Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Sugar-
land Development Corporation,"5 the Court of Appeal for the
Third Circuit held that the expropriation of a second pipeline,
when a first pipeline is already in existence, does not exclude
payment for severance damages. In a second case involving the
same public utility,54 the court held that the owner of "a real
right akin to a personal servitude" must be joined in the expro-
priation proceedings; and, in a third case, 55 that defendant land-
owners forfeit their defense to the taking of the servitude when
they fail to file answer within ten days from the service of pro-
cess, and that there is no right to trial by jury in expropriation
proceedings.
Predial servitudes may also be acquired by the effect of
acquisitive prescription of ten or thirty years. In Johnson v.
Wills,56 the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit held that a
conventional servitude of drainage, contrary to the natural servi-
tude of drainage under article 660 of the Civil Code, may be
acquired by the acquisitive prescription of ten years. This pre-
scription begins to run from the day works contrary to the nat-
ural servitude cause changes in the flow of the waters. The works
51. See LA. R.S. 19:1 (1950); "dI 45:254. In the absence of a dominant
estate, servitudes in favor of public utilities ought to be classified as limited
personal servitudes. The rules of the Civil Code governing predial servitudes
apply by analogy to limited personal servitudes. See A. YANNOPOULoS, PER-
SONAL SERVrrUDES §§ 123-25 (1968).
52. 253 La. 166, 217 So.2d 188 (1968). Justice Barham dissented on the
ground that the value of growing crops had been included in the valuation
of the land.
53. 221 So.2d 593 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 223 So.2d 872 (La.
1969).
54. Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Fruge, 210 So.2d 375 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1968).
55. Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Bonin, 217 So.2d 741 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 253 La. 735, 219 So.2d 513 (1969).
56. 220 So.2d 134 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 222 So.2d 883 (La.
1969).
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may be erected by anyone on the dominant, servient, or even a
third estate. The decision is correct: the servitude of drainage
is an apparent continuous servitude, susceptible of acquisition by
prescription; and, according to a proper interpretation of the
pertinent articles of the Civil Code, the natural servitude of
drainage may be lost or modified by the effect of prescription. 5T
Legal Servitudes
In Craig v. Montelepre Realty, Inc.,Ms action was brought
under article 667 of the Civil Code for damages to a residence,
and for worry, inconvenience, and anguish resulting from con-
struction activities on abutting property. The court of appeal
ruled that plaintiff's cause of action had been partially prescribed
under the one-year prescriptive period of article 3536 which is
applicable to delictual actions. The Supreme Court reversed on
the ground that the damage suffered by plaintiff was continuous,
and, therefore, his cause of action had not prescribed at all. By
so holding, the court avoided the troublesome question of the
prescriptive period governing actions under article 667. In a
concurring opinion, it was pointed out that article 667 establishes
strict liability that is founded on a quasi-contract rather than
fault; hence, actions under article 667 are subject to the ten-year
prescriptive period applicable to personal actions generally.
In Hathorn v. Board of Comm'rs, 9 the court dealt with ques-
tions pertaining to the exercise of a levee servitude under article
665 of the Civil Code. A levee board had adopted a resolution
which required landowners to remove fences along the levee
crown, unless cattle guards were installed in them by a certain
date. Affected landowners brought an action for injunction,
claiming that the resolution constituted an unlawful exercise of
authority and an unreasonable exercise of the legal servitude for
making and repairing flood-protection levees. In a scholarly
opinion, the court undertook a review of the historical and legis-
lative bases of the levee servitude and concluded that the levee
board had the right to demand the removal of fences or in-
stallation of cattle guards at the expense of the landowners. The
lands were located within the jurisdiction of the levee board,
57. See 3 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS 501, 975
(2d ed. Picard 1952).
58. 252 La. 502. 211 So.2d 627 (1968).
59. 218 So.2d 735 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 253 La. 881, 220
So.2d 461 (1969).
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which was authorized to adopt resolutions; the resolution in
question involved a lawful and reasonable exercise of power
under the applicable legislation; and, in the absence of "palpable
abuse," the actions of a public agency in locating, building, and
maintaining a levee are not subject to judicial review.
Termination
In Hanks v. Gulf States Utilities Co.,60 plaintiff landowner
brought action in trespass against the power company. According
to the terms of a 1949 instrument, plaintiff's ancestor in title had
granted to the power company the right to erect on the land
"one line of poles, frames or towers," which could be erected
simultaneously or at some future time, for the transmission of
electricity. The power company had originally constructed one
line of poles on the center line of the right of way; more than
ten years later, the company sought to replace the single pole
line with an "H-frame line,"6' carrying increased voltage. It was
stipulated by the parties that the grant of the servitude included
the right to erect the H-frame line; thus, the issue before the
court was whether this right had been lost by the prescription
of non-use. Plaintiff argued that three different servitudes had
been conferred, two of which had prescribed under article 789
of the Civil Code; in the alternative, if one servitude had been
conferred, that servitude contemplated three modes of use,
namely, poles, frames, and towers, and the right to construct
H-frames had prescribed under article 798 of the Civil Code.
The court held that there was a single servitude for the trans-
mission of electricity; poles, frames, or towers were not modes
of use, nor three different servitudes, but merely accessorial rights
provided within the grant of the servitude. Since the principal
right had not been lost by non-use, these accessorial rights had
been preserved; hence, there was no trespass.
The case is discussed extensively elsewhere. 2 At this point,
it is sufficient to say that the case was a close one and that deci-
sion could go one or the other way, depending on policy consid-
erations infused into the applicable rules of law. From the view-
point of contractual interpretation, valid argument could be made
60. 253 La. 946, 221 So.2d 249 (1969).
61. An H-frame consists of double poles connected by a cross-arm; It is
so named because of its resemblance to the letter H.
62. See Note, 30 LA. LAW REv. 354 (1969).
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that the grant contemplated three distinct servitudes, two of
which had prescribed.63 But once the court determined that a
single servitude had been granted, the conclusion that the power
company had not lost the right to erect H-frames was certain
to follow. From the viewpoint of property law, the character-
ization of the right to erect "poles, frames or towers" as an acces-
sory of the servitude does not seem to be correct; these were
distinct modes of use. Nevertheless, the result reached by the
majority is correct. The servitude for the transmission of elec-
tricity ought to be classified as a continuous and apparent servi-
tude. 4 The prescription of such a servitude, or of its various
modes of use, begins to run from the day the owner of the ser-
vient estate has interposed obstacles to the use of the servitude. 6
Hence, neither the servitude nor its modes of use had prescribed.
PROTECTION OF OWNERSMP
Immovables
The ownership of immovable property is protected in Louisi-
ana by real actions, a host of "quasi-real" or "fringe actions," and
by a variety of personal actions.66
According to civilian classification, the action for rescission
on account of lesion is a mixed action, real in that it involves
restoration of property and personal in that it involves nullifi-
cation of the obligation arising from the sale. In O'Brien v. Le-
gette, 7 plaintiff brought an action for the rescission of a sale of
standing timber 68 on account of lesion. In the meanwhile, how-
ever, the property had been transferred by the purchaser to a
third person, and plaintiff amended his petition to demand the
difference between the unjust price he received and the value of
the timber. Defendant raised an exception of no cause of action
on the ground that plaintiff's remedy under article 2589 of the
63. See dissenting opinion by Justice Summers, Hanks v. Gulf States
Utilities Co., 253 La. 946, 955, 221 So.2d 249, 252 (1969).
64. Yiannopoulos, Predial Servitudes; General Principles; Louisiana and
Comparative Law, 29 L. REV. 1, 38 (1968).
65. LA. CrV. CoDE art. 790.
66. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, CML LAW PROPERTY §§ 135-141 (1966).
67. 223 So.2d 165 (La. 1969). See also Peterson v. Herndon, 221 So.2d 615
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1969) (action for rescission on account of lesion; remanded
for determination of the value of the property sold).
68. Standing timber is corporeal immovable property. See LA. CiVaL CODE
art. 465; LA. R.S. 9:1103 (1950).
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Civil Code is rescission; since the property could not be restored
in kind, plaintiff's action had abated. Plaintiff maintained that his
action on account of lesion continued to exist, although, under the
circumstances, the demand was necessarily limited to the differ-
ence in value. The court observed that under the second para-
graph of article 1681 of the French Civil Code, a seller may de-
mand rescission of a sale even if the property is transferred to a
third person. The corresponding article 2591 of the Louisiana
Civil Code of 1870 does not contain an equivalent provision. The
omission, the court concluded, was intentional; therefore, the seller
does not have a cause of action in Louisiana against subsequent
acquirers of the property. The Code, however, does not exclude
an action against the original purchaser. Taking into account
the purposes of the action for lesion, the court declared that it
was not the intention of the framers of the Code to deny to the
seller any remedy merely because the purchaser has sold the
property. Relying then on article 2597 of the Civil Code, the
court held that "if the vendee (before demand) has caused or
permitted some or all of the property to be alienated, or has
otherwise made it impossible to restore it to the vendor, he is
liable to the latter to the extent that he has profited from such
action."' 9 Since there was no proof as to the profit of the pur-
chase, the case was remanded for determination of that matter.
Three justices filed separate opinions, concurring in part
and dissenting in part. The entire court was in agreement that
plaintiff had a cause of action against defendant, but there was
much disagreement as to the applicable legislation and plaintiff's
measure of recovery. According to the three dissenting justices
article 2597 was inapplicable. Justice Barham suggested appli-
cation of article 1681(2), and Justices Sanders and Summers
application of Articles 2591 and 2592. The writer cannot help but
agree with the dissenting justices that article 2597 is inappli-
cable, because it applies only when the seller resumes possession
of the property sold. In effect, the measure of recovery allowed
by the majority was the unjust enrichment of the seller. The
action on account of lesion, however, has not been limited his-
torically to the amount of the enrichment; it goes beyond that
and requires return of the property or payment of the true value.
69. O'Brien v. Legette, 223 So.2d 165, 168 (La. 1969).
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